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PARENS PATRIAE REPRESENTATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL CRISES: THE BHOPAL TRAGEDY*
INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 1984, poisonous methyl isocyanate gas leaked
from holding compartments of Union Carbide's chemical plant lo-
cated in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. As a result, more than
two thousand nearby residents were killed, and approximately two
hundred thousand more were injured.1 Legal chaos ensued. Attor-
neys from twenty-nine American law firms were soon at the scene,
aggressively sequestering victims and subsequently filing claims for
over $250 billion in damages in the United States against Union
Carbide.2 Indian lawyers, while not as prominent as their United
States counterparts, also began filing claims in India.a To further
complicate the matter, in March 1985, the Indian government
passed a statute appointing itself the exclusive representative for
the victims, 4 and pursuant thereto filed claims against Union Car-
* On May 12, 1986, the presiding judge dismissed the case against Union Carbide
on forum non conveniens grounds. Hiltzik, U.S. Judge Returning Bhopal Case to India, L.A.
Times, May 13, 1986, Part 1, at 1, col. 3. Despite the dismissal, the issue of parens patriae
representation in transnational torts must still be addressed as a similar case is bound to
arise in the future. Significantly, U.S. District Judge John F. Keenan did not rule on the
applicability of parens patriae, leaving its use in this type of case uncertain. This article
focuses on the only case in which this issue has arisen to date.
1. Diamond, U.S. Lawyers Plan Suit To Keep Bhopal Clients, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4,
1985, at Dl, col. 1.
2. Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal
Tragedy, 20 Tax. INT'L L.J. 273, 290 (1985). The United States attorneys arrived on the
scene as early as December I1, 1984. Stevens, U.S. Lawyers are Arriving to Prepare Big
Damage Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at AI0, col. 3. Among the legal teams who filed
suit were: Melvin Belli, a class action suit for $15 billion; Gould & Sayre, a class action for
$20 billion; Coale & Associates, $10 billion; Mr. Musselwhite, $50 billion; Kenneth Ditkow-
sky, $50 billion; and David Jaroslawicz, $20 billion. Dhavan, For Whom? And For What?
Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 295, 304 (1985); Stevens,
supra, at A10, col. 3.
3. Dhavan, supra note 2, at 299. The Madhya Pradesh Congress Legal Aid Com-
mittee filed 120 cases totaling over 200,000 rupees on behalf of each victim against Union
Carbide. Id. By March, 1985, about 2,000 individual claims were filed and the Legal Aid
Society had plans to file 36,000 more. Galanter, supra note 2, at 290.
4. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Ordinance, 1985 [herein-
after cited as Act], reproduced infra at Appendix A.
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bide in the United States.5
This scenario demonstrates that all interested parties were not
equipped to begin organizing the legal problems presented by the
crisis. Effective mechanisms for instituting orderly legal proceed-
ings did not exist. The Indian government appeared to be the first
to contemplate organized litigation when it passed the statute mak-
ing itself the representative for all victims. Acting in a parens pa-
triae6 capacity for the claimants, India believed it could best serve
its citizens' interests by seeking relief in United States courts.7
However, India's attempt to unite the scattered efforts for reme-
dies was thwarted. India's statute appeared to grant its government
parens patriae status, a common law method of representation used
in various contexts in United States courts. But, no American court
had yet allowed a foreign sovereign to act as parens patriae in
United States proceedings. The existing precedents seemed to pre-
clude India's attempt to represent its citizens. However, this was a
case of first impression which required resolution to disentangle the
confusion resulting from the lawsuits filed. Hence, a new question
was presented to United States courts: Should a foreign govern-
ment have standing to sue in American courts as parens patriae
representative for its citizens when the law of that country so
permits?
This Comment will first examine the development of American
parens patriae law, both within the United States and with regard
to foreign sovereigns, in order to demonstrate the ambiguities which
confronted the Bhopal litigants.8 Second, it will discuss the peculiar
circumstances of the Union Carbide case in light of American
parens patriae law and the Indian statute purporting to grant the
Indian government such status.' Third, it will show that the Indian
statute in fact satisfied the American parens patriae requirements.
Finally, it will examine relevant policy concerns and transnational
legal principles in order to formulate guidelines for other countries
which will surely endeavor to act as parens patriae.10
5. Lewin, Carbide is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9,
1985, at Al, col. 5. Subsequently, attorneys from several United States law firms filed suit in
India to prevent the Indian government from representing the victims. Diamond, supra note
1, at AI, col. 1.
6. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Lewin, supra note 5, at Di, col. 1.
8. See infra notes 11-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 99-160 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARENS PATRIAE LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
Parens patriae issues arise when a governmental entity attempts
to represent its citizens' claims in one consolidated legal proceed-
ing. In the United States, parens patriae has undergone varied ap-
plications in diverse contexts. The principle has developed primarily
from case law.
The doctrine of parens patriae representation originated under
the British common law system.11 It was first applied under the
concept of "royal prerogative," in which the king was the guardian
of the people, particularly those citizens unable to care for them-
selves.12 Practical considerations such as pecuniary interests of the
disadvantaged citizens also prompted the king to act as parens pa-
triae.13 The parens patriae doctrine was imported in its prerogative
form into the American judicial system early in this country's his-
tory.14 Its use originally centered around juvenile delinquency and
the juvenile court system.15 It has since been applied in the area of
the mentally ill." However, due process considerations of individual
liberty have limited, although not entirely eliminated, parens pa-
triae in this prerogative form.17
In addition to the prerogative usage of parens patriae, United
States courts developed a second application of this doctrine: the
state suing as parens patriae to represent its "quasi-sovereign" in-
terests. Quasi-sovereign interests, while not easily defined,"8 gener-
ally involve cases where the state sues for its own well-being, apart
from those damages individuals may have sustained." The state
acts to protect its entire territorial citizenry and/or economy.20 It
cannot, however, act as a nominal party to represent individuals
11. See generally Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as
Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895 (1976).
12. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982). Those considered unable to take care of themselves were infants, idiots and lunatics.
Curtis, supra note I1, at 896 (citing J. CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGA-
TIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820)).
13. Curtis, supra note 11, at 898.
14. Id. at 899-900. By the early 1800's, reformers were invoking prerogative parens
patriae principles in northeastern states. Id.
15. Id. at 900-02.
16. Id. at 903.
17. Id. The parameters of due process rights in juvenile court proceedings have not
yet been definitively outlined.
18. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601.
19. Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae
Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRODS. 411, 412 (1970).
20. Curtis, supra note 11, at 908.
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who are the real parties in interest.2"
In the earliest cases involving quasi-sovereign interests, environ-
mental concerns and injunctive relief were the focus of parens pa-
triae causes of action. In Missouri v. Illinois,22 local government
entities in Illinois dumped large amounts of raw sewage into water
used by Missouri residents for drinking and other purposes.23 The
Court found that "if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a
State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and
defend them . . ." for all residents might be indirectly injured from
the spread of disease. .4
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,25 a Tennessee corporation
allowed noxious gas to escape which spread over part of Georgia. 26
The Court found that the suit was not merely between private citi-
zens, despite the fact that Georgia owned little of the affected land.
Rather, the Court held that "in its capacity of quasi-sovereign...
the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. ' 2
The Court in Kansas v. Colorado28 recognized also that the pros-
perity of a certain tract of land "affects the general welfare of the
State. The controversy rises, therefore, above a mere question of
private local right and involves a matter of State interest ... "'9
These cases demonstrate that American courts were receptive to
consolidated governmental action when substantial portions of the
populace were harmed.
As the doctrine of parens patriae developed, its parameters were
narrowed in the context of injunctions for public nuisance. In Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia,0 the plaintiff states sued as parens pa-
triae for damages to natural gas supplies caused by the defendant
states.31 The Court found that the states were pioperly acting
within their parens patriae capacity, but noted that a state so act-
ing must have "an interest [such as the general welfare of its popu-
lace] apart from that of the individuals affected .. .not merely a
21. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 600.
22. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
23. Id. at 209-14.
24. Id. at 241.
25. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
26. Id. at 236.
27. Id. at 237.
28. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
29. Id. at 99.
30. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
31. Id. at 581.
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remote or ethical interest but one which is immediate and recog-
nized by law."
81 2
In Oklahoma ex. rel. Johnson v. Cook,"3 the Court finally halted
advances in certain parens patriae actions. When the plaintiff state
attempted to enforce a bank commissioner's claim against a share-
holder,8" the Court denied the state representative status. It found
that "the State must show a direct interest of its own and not
merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real
parties in interest."35 Thus, United States courts would not apply
parens patriae doctrine in its quasi-sovereign form without first ex-
amining the interest of the state itself.
In addition to environmental cases, United States courts have in-
voked parens patriae in antitrust suits since 1945. This evolution
has also brought a new remedy, damages, to the forefront. In the
first major parens patriae antitrust case, Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co.,86 the state of Georgia alleged, as representative of its citi-
zenry, that the defendants conspired to fix railroad rates.3 7 Al-
lowing Georgia to act as parens patriae, the Court stated:
Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a
wrong which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people,
shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates
her to an inferior economic position among her sister States.
These are matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has
an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be
affected. Georgia's interest is not remote; it is immediate."
The case involved a suit for both an injunction and damages,3' and
the Court implied that it considered damages an appropriate parens
patriae remedy.40
Twenty-five years later, the issue of damages as a remedy in eco-
nomic parens patriae actions arose again. In Hawaii v. Standard
32. Id. at 592.
33. 304 U.S. 387 (1938).
34. Id. at 388-89.
35. Id. at 396. The Court's reasoning included preventing a floodgate of claims based
on the Court's original jurisdiction. Id.; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1982), and cases cited therein.
36. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
37. Id. at 443.
38. Id. at 451.
39. Id. at 445.
40. Comment, supra note 19, at 413. In Georgia, damages were denied not because
Georgia sued as parens patriae, but because freight railroad rates had been approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Curtis, supra note 11, at 910 n.65.
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Oil Co. of California,4" the state of Hawaii sued as parens patriae
to recover damages to the general economy of the state under the
antitrust provisions of the Clayton Act.4 It alleged that the defend-
ant had restrained trade in and monopolized the refined petroleum
products market.4" The Court refused to allow the state to sue for
treble damages as parens patriae. It stated that Hawaii could ade-
quately redress the wrongs committed against it by filing a class
action suit." It also found that substantial danger of duplicative
recovery existed if Hawaii were allowed to act as parens patriae,4
5
since its quasi-sovereign injuries were merely the sum of the inju-
ries of its private citizens.40 The Court further noted that the dam-
ages to Hawaii's general economy were really no more than those
suffered by consumers who could recover under the Clayton Act. 47
Finally, the Court implied that Hawaii would have standing to sue
if it were merely seeking injunctive relief.48 It thus appears that
Standard Oil has limited the parens patraie doctrine severely for
economic damages in the antitrust context.49
41. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). For an interesting analysis of lower court rulings in this
case, see Comment, supra note 19.
42. 405 U.S. at 260.
43. Id. at 253.
44. Id. at 266.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, which provides specific guidelines for defining the plaintiff
class, prevents double recovery. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 266.
46. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264. Hawaii had challenged the defendants on the
basis of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 then in effect. The applicable section
then stated in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ...shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained. ... The Court found no clear expression of intent in section 4 to permit the
parens patriae action. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264. For a further discussion of double
recovery in the Union Carbide case context, see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
47. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264.
48. Id. at 261-62.
49. Curtis, supra note I1, at 913, aptly explains the Standard Oil decision as follows:
The state's argument in favor of treble damages in cases brought by the state in
its parens patriae capacity ignores the development of the quasi-sovereign doctrine
and confuses the prerogative with the quasi-sovereign basis of parens patriae ac-
tions. Justice Holmes' dictum in [Georgia v.] Tennessee Copper [206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907)] that quasi-sovereign interests are "independent of and behind the titles of
its citizen . . ." had gained recognition as the central premise of the quasi-sovereign
suit. In that capacity the state sues not on behalf of its own proprietary interests
which might be injured, but on behalf of the entire state, as Holmes described it,
"[A]ll the earth and air within its domain." [ld.] The hallmark of the quasi-sover-
eign suit has been the injunction to stop injury to the totality of the state's common-
wealth. Damages are not only unsuited to this theory of state relief, they also defy
measurement. No common law precedent exists to support payment of damages sus-
tained by a particular group of persons to whatever body chooses to sue. Those who
would allow the state that power commit the error of confusing the American prece-
dent of quasi-sovereign interests with the common law precedent of the sovereign's
prerogative responsibility of caring for the dependent classes. . . . (footnotes
[Vol. 17
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In recent years, two cases have further refined the parens patriae
doctrine with regard to actions for damages. 0 In 1975, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the first
parens patriae case dealing with foreign sovereigns in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord.'1 In Pfizer, the governments of Vietnam and India brought
suit alleging antitrust violations under a parens patriae claim as
"official representatives" for citizens of their respective countries.' 2
As such, they alleged that the defendant pharmaceutical companies
had engaged in price fixing within their countries.53 In allowing
parens patriae representation, the trial court held that the parens
patriae arguments which normally applied to states were not salient
in the context of foreign governments. That court noted that the
defendants need not be concerned that double recovery would arise
since 1) the suit would be given res judicata effect and 2) practical
obstacles would prevent most of the involved foreign individuals
from filing claims.'
The appellate court reversed, holding that foreign governments
may not sue on behalf of their citizens as parens patriae represent-
atives for damages resulting from violations of antitrust laws. The
court stated: "A parens patriae action cannot be brought to collect
the damage claim of one legally entitled to sue in his own right.
The mere fact that the claimant or creditor is a foreign national
does not afford him or his government access to judicial procedures
barred to domestic creditors." '
The court placed special significance on alleged due process vio-
lations, holding that the suit would have been better brought as a
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
omitted).
Note that the author also states, "[njevertheless, like the concept of parens patriae, the
theory of a treble damages action, brought by the state in its quasi-sovereign capacity, has
exhibited a strong staying power." Curtis, supra note 11, at 914.
50. A third recent injunctive remedy case also exists: Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). This case dealt with employment discrimi-
nation. Justice Brennan's concurrence is particularly enlightening. It states that "a State is
no ordinary litigant. As a sovereign entity, a State is entitled to assess its needs, and decide
which concerns of its citizens warrant its protection and intervention." Id. at 612. The case
demonstrates that courts realize the many possible uses of governmental representation.
51. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 614.
53. Id. at 613.
54. Id. at 615-16. The trial court also dispelled due process arguments regarding no-
tice and participation in the lawsuit by stating that "'the relationship between a foreign
government and its citizens is not restricted by the Constitution of the United States.'" Id.
at 616 (quoting district court Misc. Order No. 74-37, Appendix at 18, 21).
55. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 616.
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dure.5' The plaintiffs, apparently, asserted a proprietary class ac-
tion style claim under the guise of a parens patriae suit.5 7 The
plaintiffs stated that a class action would not be financially feasible,
and therefore requested permission to sue as parens patriae for citi-
zens legally entitled, but practically unable, to sue on their own
behalf.58 The court relied particulary on Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co.' in rejecting the plaintiffs' claims. It also stated:
We are not persuaded that these decisions are inapplicable merely
because the plaintiffs are foreign governments suing on behalf of
their nationals. Principles of comity, international law and ex-
isting United States treaties do not afford foreign sovereigns the
right to press their citizens' claims in a manner barred to domes-
tic states vis-a-vis their citizens. Reliance on authorities which
sanction a sovereign's right to represent its citizens when their
claim is against another sovereign who has not consented to suit
in its own courts is misplaced. Foreign creditors are to be afforded
legal access to our courts on the same basis as United States resi-
dents; practical difficulties notwithstanding, their status as for-
eigners does not entitle them to a more favorable remedy and
procedures.60
However, the court did suggest that action by Congress on the issue
would allow the foreign sovereigns the relief they wished. It stated
that "[t]he remedy plaintiffs seek . . . must come from Congress,
who is best able to weigh its economic and political consequences
and to consider alternative means of [enforcement]." '61
Since the Pfizer case, one court has addressed the question of the
parens patriae doctrine pursuant to congressional legislation. In
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribu-
tors," the court held a state could act as parens patriae representa-
tive for its citizens when authorized to do so by a federal statute,
irrespective of less permissive common law or state provisions. In
Mid-Atlantic, a number of states sued for statewide economic dam-
ages pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976," which expressly permitted states to bring parens pa-
56. id.
57. Id. at 617.
58. Id.
59. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
60. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 618-19 (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 620.
62. 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1982).
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triae actions for damages from antitrust violations. 64 The states al-
leged that the defendants had conspired to fix the prices of Toyota
vehicles in their states.65 The court found that the Antitrust Im-
provements Act changed only procedural and not substantive prin-
ciples of law." The court found that the statute was "aimed pri-
marily at enlarging the potential for consumer recovery for
antitrust violations by effectively bypassing the burdensome re-
quirements of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, that might tend to dis-
suade private litigants from pursuing conventional consumer class
actions for antitrust injury.... 67 In addition, the court noted that
states have the authority to bring suit when the case advances pub-
lic interest. 68
In sum, the foregoing demonstrates several important issues sur-
rounding the question of whether a foreign sovereign may appoint
itself parens patriae representative for its injured citizens and
thereby satisfy American legal requirements for application of the
doctrine. First, the English common law doctrine of royal preroga-
tive over those unable to care for themselves has been limited in the
United States in light of due process concerns. Second, American
case law has firmly established that a state acting in a quasi-sover-
eign parens patriae capacity must have substantially more than a
mere nominal interest in its citizens' claims. 9 Third, as a general
rule, the parens patriae doctrine is narrowly construed. There ap-
pears to be a presumption against its application,70 particularly in
the economic damages context, where duplicative recovery is possi-
ble and class action suits are an established procedural alternative.
Fourth, the status of the law concerning a foreign government's
statute granting it parens patriae rights is subject to new principles:
On the one hand, foreign sovereigns who act in a proprietary capac-
ity in an antitrust suit without any legislative authority whatsoever
have no standing to sue as parens patriae representative. 71 On the
64. Mid-Atlantic, 704 F.2d at 127 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1)).
65. Mid-Atlantic, 704 F.2d at 127.
66. Id. at 128.
67. Id. See also infra, Appendix B for text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
68. Mid-Atlantic, 704 F.2d at 131. In a footnote the court stated "[a] state may well
have a 'public interest' in maintaining an action without having a 'quasi-sovereign' interest
sufficient to support original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court or to overcome an eleventh
amendment bar to the recovery of damages." Id. at n.13.
69. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982).
70. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1975); Dhavan, supra
note 2, at 303.
71. This was implied by the court in Pfizer when it stated that authority for the
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other hand, a federal statute authorizing a state to act as parens
patriae is valid despite a silent state common law background. 2
Fifth, the entire nature of parens patriae is esoteric; where the doc-
trine has been suppressed in one usage, it has several times in
American legal history resurfaced anew in a different setting."s Be-
cause of these considerations, the status of parens patriae law is far
from settled, and there exists a need for further refinement in the
area of transnational cases.
These ramifications were particularly important to the Indian
government in the Union Carbide case. If the government was to
effectively represent its people as parens patriae, it needed to find
support for its position amidst the unusual circumstances surround-
ing the crisis. Perhaps the unique nature of the case provided an
ideal situation in which application of the parens patriae doctrine
was appropriate.
II. THE CONDITIONS OF THE UNION CARBIDE CASE
The Bhopal crisis left in its wake a host of litigation; however, it
also created the potential for the development of new legal princi-
ples, including new applications of the parens patriae doctrine. As
indicated by several factors arising in the early stages of the Bhopal
litigation, established methods for settling disputes may be unwork-
able in the context of transnational torts. These unusual circum-
stances included the concentration of lawsuits in the United States,
the need for centralization of claims, India's representation statute,
and the class action alternative.
Initially, parties focused their legal efforts in the United States.
Although some lawsuits were filed in India by Indian attorneys,",
the litigants directed their greatest efforts in the United States.75
By 1985, American lawyers, for instance, had filed claims in excess
governments to act as parens patriae should come from Congress. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 620.
72. Mid-Atlantic, 704 F.2d at 129-30.
73. See Curtis, supra note 1I, at 895-96. The author states "[b]ecause it is uninhib-
ited by a strict conceptual or precedential definition, this theory [of parens patriae] imparts
an extensive discretionary power to the court, agency, or government which is able to justify
its usage."
74. See Diamond, supra note 1.
75. Galanter, supra note 2, at 284. Within a few days of the disaster, the regional
Indian government expressed a desire to sue Union Carbide in the United States. This plan
was reiterated later in December 1984. In addition, the Indian Central government focused
its attention on the United States from an early date. Id. In April, 1985, the Indian govern-
ment made good on its threat by filing suit against Union Carbide in the United States.
Lewin, supra note 5, at Al, col. I.
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of $250 billion." They cited reasons for the concentration in United
States as including the following: 1) higher compensation for vic-
tims in the United States courts, 2) high filing fees in India, 3)
potential inability of Indian victims to pay non-contingent lawyers'
fees in India, 4) long-term nature of Indian legal proceedings, 5)
application of the certain United States legal principles, and 6)
ability of the plaintiffs to pursue parent company liability under
United States corporate law.7
The litigation became very complex, even in the early stages. As
a result of the spread of suits among many federal courts, a judicial
panel for the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York consolidated all claims of February 6, 1985:71
We note that Union Carbide is a New York corporation and that
relevant witnesses and documents may be located at its corporate
headquarters in nearby Danbury, Connecticut. We also note that
the Southern District of New York has more pending actions
than any other district and is, according to the preponderance of
the parties' representations to the Panel, relatively more conven-
ient for many parties, including plaintiffs and defendant Union
Carbide, and witnesses.79
The panel also noted that "[c]entralization . . . [is] necessary in
order to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pre-
trial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their coun-
sel, and the judiciary."80
After the consolidation, the Indian government, in March of
1985, passed a statute appointing itself the exclusive representative
for the victims." Earlier, the Indian government and United States
lawyers had been battling for chief control of the case.8 2 Conse-
quently, India's statute was enacted partially in response to actions
by American attorneys who "unnecessarily complicated the situa-
tion."83 The Indian government believed that United States attor-
76. Galanter, supra note 2, at 290. See also supra note 2, for a breakdown of the
different lawsuits thus far filed by United States attorneys.
77. Stevens, supra note 2, at AlO, col. 3. For a discussion of forum considerations,
see infra note 92.
78. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.D.L. 1985).
79. Id. at 1036. In addition to the federal district for Southern New York, suits had
also been filed in the federal districts for Northern Illinois, Southern West Virginia, Eastern
New York, Southern Florida, Eastern Pennsylvania and Connecticut.
80. Id.
81. Act, supra note 4.
82. Diamond, supra note 1, at DI, col. 2.
83. Galanter, supra note 2, at 285.
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neys had unnecessarily complicated the situation, 4 presumably be-
cause of the attorneys' quick rush to the disaster scene and
subsequent multidistrict filings. With the enactment of the statute,
the Indian government believed that American lawyers would have
to work under its main counsel.85
Regardless of the motivation for passing the statute, its provi-
sions demonstrated extensive control over the plaintiffs' claims.
First, in its role as parens patriae, the Indian government asserted
that it was the chief representative of any plaintiff in all litigation
concerning the Bhopal disaster, both within and without India."
Second, while the government had set itself up as the primary ad-
ministrative clearinghouse for victims' claims, it also permitted in-
dividuals to retain their own counsel to act "in association" with
the government.8 7 At the same time, the activity of individual attor-
neys, in India at least, appeared extremely curtailed. As one author
noted before the dismissal of the cases filed in American courts, the
Act
derails any litigation in India. It empowers the Government of
India to interpose an administrative compensation process as the
exclusive primary resort of the victims. Apparently victims are
cut off from direct recourse to the courts; Indian courts are per-
force foreclosed from any innovations that would enlarge their ca-
pacity to address such instances of mass victimization."
Third, the statute stated that the Indian government had control of
all cases, whether pending or yet to be filed.89 Finally, the statute
gave the Indian government the right to pursue all avenues of legal
recourse, including "compromise." 90 Pursuant to this statute, the
Indian government filed suit in the United States District Court for
Southern New York on April 9, 1985.91
Several legal complications existed which could have foreclosed
the entire Indian strategy.92 Of particular concern to the parties
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Act, supra note 4, § 3(1).
87. Id. § 3(4).
88. Galanter, supra note 4, at 286 (footnote omitted).
89. Act, supra note 4, § 3(3).
90. Id. § 3(2). In fact, after passing the statute, the government, acting as parens
patriae reportedly rejected a settlement offer of $200 million by Union Carbide. Galanter,
supra note 2, at 285.
91. Lewin, supra note 5, at Al, col. 5.
92. For an interesting discussion of problems unrelated to parens patriae, see gener-
ally Symposium. The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 267-339
(1985). An important issue was the possibility (and now the reality) that the court would
(Vol. 17
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was the strong possibility that the court might have found it prefer-
able to try the case as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. " Current American case law appears to
prefer class actions over parens patriae representation in transna-
tional cases.9 4 Several United States attorneys had precautiously
drafted their claims as class actions on behalf of individual vic-
tims." Another attorney, however, expressed concern that a class
action was simply not feasible in this case by stating: "I don't be-
lieve in just pulling a figure out of the air.""
Another important complication was the possibility of settlement.
In fact, American attorneys representing the claimants presented a
settlement offer with Union Carbide to the court in March, 1986. 9
The Indian government forcefully condemned this act and implied
it would not cooperate with the settlement." However, if the court
had accepted the settlement plan, India might well have been left
with no further recourse in the United States.
The unusual circumstances of the Union Carbide case demon-
strates the need for reevaluation of United States parens patriae
law. Several factors lend insight into the feasibility of India's at-
tempt to represent its citizens in American courts.
find that India was a more appropriate forum for the litigation. It was clear that a forum
non conveniens motion would be one of Union Carbide's first strategies as the litigation pro-
ceeded to pretrial motion stages. Robertson, Introduction to the Bhopal Symposium, 20 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 269, 270 (1985). In that regard, the fact that the Indian government had ap-
pointed itself as parens patriae added potency to the notion that the Indian legal system
could better handle the entire matter. Galanter, supra note 2, at 286. The state of the law
regarding forum non conveniens is unclear and there is a lack of consistency in rulings.
Compare Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (holding American courts were not
the proper forum for disputes arising from an air crash in Scotland) with In re Air Crash
Disaster near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (holding United States
courts were the proper forum for cases resulting from a crash in India). In fact, on May 13,
1986, the judge in the Bhopal case did dismiss the suits on forum grounds. Hiltzik, U.S.
Judge Returning Bhopal Case to India, L.A. Times, May 13, 1986, Part 1, at 1, col. 3. F.
Lee Bailey, an attorney in the case, said there would be an appeal. Id. at 17, col. 1. Other
related problems include the application of Indian law and other issues regarding tort law
specialization.
93. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). See infra, Appendix B for
the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
94. For further discussion of the class action versus parens patriae dispute, see supra
notes 41-68 and accompanying text and infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
95. Dobrzynski, Glaberson, King, Powell and Helm, Union Carbide Fights for Its
Life, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 1984, at 52, 56 [hereinafter Union Carbide Fights for Its Life].
Melvin Belli and Gould & Sayre are among the attorney teams drafting class actions. Id.
See also Stevens, supra note 2, at AI0, col. 4.
96. Stevens, supra note 2, at AI0, col. 4.
97. Tempest, India Scorns Union Carbide Bhopal Offer, L.A. Times, Mar. 25, 1986,
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III. FACTORS SUPPORTING THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S Parens
Patriae STATUS
Whether the Indian statute authorizing its government to act as
parens patriae satisfied American legal requirements is still a com-
plex issue. When examined, the Indian government's endeavor ap-
peared to make practical and theoretical sense. This assertion,
when considered in light of the unusual circumstances of the case,
is supported by the ambiguities in the current status of American
case law, policy concerns, and principles of international comity.
A. The Current Status of American Law
The issue of whether a foreign sovereign's statute granting its
government parens patriae status in United States courts satisfies
American requirements is one of first impression. The current state
of the law is embodied in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,99 which held that
foreign sovereigns had no standing to sue in American courts as
parens patriae representatives of their citizens.100 However, Pfizer
can be distinguished from the Union Carbide case on two major
points.
First, the Pfizer holding dealt expressly with the state's interest
only in the context of antitrust damage actions.10' The court placed
considerable reliance on Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Califor-
nia,'02 which specifically held that class actions are preferable to
parens patriae suits where antitrust violations are involved.' Also,
the court in Pfizer found that plaintiffs had asserted no quasi-sover-
eign interest, but merely a proprietary one.'" The court believed
that the assertion of mere proprietary concerns warranted a class
action rather than a parens patriae suit.'0'
India's concern was different from that of the sovereigns in Pfi-
zer, rendering that court's reasoning inapplicable to this case. India
did not claim mere economic antitrust damages; it asserted the in-
terests of over 200,000 physically injured and deceased persons.
While its attempt to officially represent its citizens did not fit
clearly into any previously defined area of parens patriae represen-
99. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
100. Id. at 616.
101. Id.
102. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
103. Id. at 266.
104. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 617.
105. Id. The proprietary interest asserted in Pfizer appeared to be the sum total of
damages to individuals and businesses in the affected countries. Id. at 613-14.
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tation, it appeared India was trying to invoke a new, "hybrid" style
of parens patriae. In one sense, India's concerns were not quasi-
sovereign at all, but came under the old British common law pre-
rogative category.1 06 The government was stepping in to protect
and aid those citizens who were unable to help themselves and who
had no practical way to pursue independent actions. Although this
is not a traditional class of dependent citizens as recognized by An-
glo-American common law, 107 the principle behind India's action
was consistent with prerogative parens patriae. In another sense,
India's concerns were indeed quasi-sovereign. However, unlike Pfi-
zer, the quasi-sovereign interest here revolved around the general
well-being of the citizenry and the environment in India. The gov-
ernment's interest thus appeared to follow early 20th century
American cases dealing with injunctive nuisance actions.108 In yet
another sense, India's case appeared to follow the antitrust suits in
that it asked for damages as a remedy.109 Consequently, the Indian
government was asserting a new, "hybrid" species of parens patriae
by incorporating several established theories.
This hybrid prerogative/quasi-sovereign theory was a potential
method for India to fulfill American parens patriae legal require-
ments. In the complaint filed on behalf of India in the United
States District Court for Southern New York, India appeared to
have asserted the hybrid status as follows: "India is suing Union
Carbide 'to secure the health and well-being, both physical and ec-
onomic, of all victims of the disaster, almost all of whom are physi-
cally and/or financially or otherwise incapable of individually liti-
gating their claims against the defendant ... .' "110 The use of a
hybrid type of parens patriae claim has not been addressed by a
United States court and because of the versatility of the entire doc-
trine, there is leverage for a new application to transnational tort
cases. As has been aptly stated, "[t]he concept of parens patriae
has exhibited a remarkable staying power. Rebuked in one branch
of the law, it makes its appearance in another; even when circum-
scribed, it remains actively viable within its new limits."1' This has
106. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text for those traditonal situations in
which the Anglo-American courts have recognized the use of parens patriae.
108. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 41-68 and accompanying text.
110. Lewin, supra note 5, at D2, col. I (emphasis added) (quoting complaint filed in
April, 1985, by the Indian government against Union Carbide).
111. Curtis, supra note 11, at 895.
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been demonstrated throughout American legal history as parens
patriae has been applied to such varied cases as juvenile delin-
quency, environmental concerns, antitrust, discrimination, injunc-
tions and damages claims.
112
The second way in which the Union Carbide case differed from
Pfizer concerns the absence or presence of a foreign statute grant-
ing the sovereign parens patriae status. In Pfizer, no foreign statute
conveyed parens patriae status to the government of India or Viet-
nam. The court there recognized the plaintiffs' due process con-
cerns of notice and ability to participate in the legal proceedings.1 Is
Ultimately, however, the court felt it could not permit foreign citi-
zens to gain access to procedures not available to United States
citizens. 4
The fact that the Indian government enacted a statute appointing
itself the official representative for its citizens in the Union Carbide
case made much of the Pfizer reasoning inapplicable. As the trial
court in Pfizer had stated, "'the relationship between a foreign
government and its citizens is not restricted by the Constitution of
the United States.' 1115 The trial court's statement appears more
salient in the Union Carbide case than does the appellate court's
holding to the contrary. If India's government saw fit to appoint
itself representative of its citizens in United States courts, then it
was for Indian courts to decide whether Indian citizens' due process
rights were being violated.110
Although the Pfizer court would not allow foreign citizens reme-
dies not available to United States citizens, it seemingly expressed
approval of foreign sovereign parens patriae status if some sort of
federal legislation were enacted.117 In 1983, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was able to address the
issue of parens patriae representation pursuant to a statute in Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribu-
tors.11 8 In Mid-Atlantic, a federal statute authorized states to bring
parens patriae actions on behalf of citizens injured by antitrust vio-
112. See, e.g., supra notes 11-73, and accompanying text.
113. 522 F.2d at 616. These concerns would presumably be mitigated in the event that
a class action suit was the vehicle by which the governments sought to protect their citizens.
114. Id. at 618-19.
115. Id. at 616 (quoting district court Misc. Order No. 74-37, Appendix at 18, 21).
116. The Indian government in fact recognized its citizens' due process rights by per-
mitting individuals to act "in association" with government legal teams. Act, supra note 4, §
3(4).
117. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 620.
118. 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
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lations. 11" The court found that common law applications of parens
patriae could be expanded by statutory grants. 20 The court found
acceptable the statutory purpose, which was to allow suits to be
brought in parens patriae to bypass cumbersome class action re-
quirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requirements which the court believed would discourage conven-
tional class action suits by individuals.1
21
The Mid-Atlantic case portended three significant ramifications
for India in the Union Carbide case. First, United States courts are
not averse to allowing governmental entitles to bypass the burden-
some Rule 23 class action requirements where special circum-
stances exist. The circumstances in Bhopal were certainly special in
that the number of victims is perhaps larger than any in history.
22
This would make class action notice requirements a major task in
itself, and could take years to complete. Second, Mid-Atlantic
weakens the Pfizer rationale that foreign citizens may not use pro-
cedures not afforded to United States citizens. Now that American
states may gain parens patriae access to courts through statutory
enactments, it is conceivable that a foreign statute could serve the
same purpose. Third, at the very least, Mid-Atlantic makes it al-
most certain that a United States federal statute appointing a for-
eign sovereign as parens patriae would withstand judicial scru-
tiny. 2 3 Thus, if United States courts needed legislative support
before accepting the Indian statute, Congress would have been
well-advised to enact its own legislation accommodating India.
The state of American law regarding transnational parens pa-
triae cases is unclear with regard to situations such as the Union
Carbide case. It seems apparent that the parens patriae doctrine
can be expanded to include such transnational tort crisis. Support
for this assertion exists also in relevant policy concerns.
119. Id. at 127, where the court noted that the Antitrust Improvements Act provides
that an "'attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such State, as
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State,' to secure treble money
damages for injury to their property flowing from violation of the antitrust laws." (footnote
omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1)(1982)).
120. Mid-Atlantic, 704 F.2d at 129-30.
121. Id. at 128. See also infra Appendix B.
122. As a comparison, claims from asbestos-related injuries in Manville total 52,700.
Claims from injuries regarding Agent Orange number 40,000-50,000. Union Carbide Fights
for Its Life, supra note 95, at 56. In contrast, "Im]ore than 2,000 people died and 200,000
were injured in the [Bhopal] accident." Diamond, supra note 1, at D1, col. 1.
123. See Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an
International Settlement, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 321, 330 (1985).
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B. Policy Concerns
Several policy considerations support the Indian government's
endeavor to represent its citizens exclusively. Of particular impor-
tance are the well-being of the parties, India's sovereign immunity,
and the avoidance of duplicative recovery.
First, and possibly most importantly, Union Carbide and India
would have both benefited from India's parens patriae status.
1 24
American attorneys filed claims in excess of $250 billion,12 5 which
surely would have bankrupted the corporation. 26 In fact, many
American attorneys expressed that their primary motive was the
potentially huge contingent fees.12 7 These lawyers appeared uncon-
cerned with the possible ramifications if Union Carbide folded. The
Indian government, on the other hand, had a substantial interest in
keeping Union Carbide solvent. Union Carbide is a huge multina-
tional corporation, serving the world with technological innovations
which aid people worldwide.128 Union Carbide's partially-owned
subsidiary, Union Carbide India, operates thirteen plants in India:
The corporation provides employment, goodwill and charity for the
citizens of India. 2 If the Indian government chose to protect the
viability of the entire enterprise, it would thus have aided not only
Union Carbide's stockholders, but also the citizens of India and
other developing nations. As a result, if the Indian government
124. Arguably, Union Carbide's interests were best served in United States courts
even though many parties argued that an Indian forum was best for Union Carbide. In
India, Union Carbide's image may be severely hurt through long-term litigation. Also, litiga-
tion may entail personal threats to Union Carbide lawyers, since gheraos (great crowds
which literally surround government officials and effectively prevent them from acting) have
occurred more than once in Indian history. See MOORHOUS E, CALCUTTA 312-14 (1971).
125. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
126. In 1984, Union Carbide's total assets equalled $10.8 billion. Union Carbide
Fights for its Life, supra note 95, at 54. This is less than one-twentieth of the amount of the
total claims filed by United States attorneys. There is also evidence that Union Carbide may
have difficulty selling its assets at book value since two-thirds of them are in overcapacitized
industries. Id. at 53.
127. Richard E. Brown, an associate on the Melvin Belli team has stated, "Our moti-
vation is to make money-make no mistake about that." Diamond, Lawyers' Fees in Bhopal
Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1985, at D2, col. 2. Attorneys in asbestos cases received over 60%
of all awards as fees. Stein, Paying Bhopal Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1984, at A3 1, col.
5.
128. A breakdown of Union Carbide's worldwide sales in 1983 was as follows: Petro-
chemicals, $2.6 billion; Industrial Gases, $1.4 billion; Metals and Carbon Products, $1 bil-
lion; Consumer Products, $1.9 billion; and Technology Services & Specialty Products, $2.2
billion. Union Carbide Fights for Its Life, supra note 95, at 55.
129. From 1956-83, Union Carbide India Ltd. paid over $300 million in excise duties
and income taxes. In 1983, it also donated $44,000 to relief funds for natural disaster vic-
tims. Reinhold, Union Carbide of India: Image is is Shattered, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984,
at A9, at col. 3-4.
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were to act as parens patriae, it would have proceeded with greater
empathy toward the valuable corporation than would have United
States attorneys.
Nevertheless, India would have protected its citizens' interests.
While Union Carbide would most likely have been able to continue
its operations world-wide if a lesser, government-procured award
were reached, the victims in India would not have been deprived of
adequate compensation. The average Indian foreman earns approx-
imately $100 (U.S.) per month. 8 It has been stated that $24,000
would be equal to income for fifty years for many of the victims.131
Because American courts calculate damages based mainly on lost
earnings, it is likely that awards would have been low enough to
allow Union Carbide to stay in operation, while still compensating
victims adequately.132
Another related policy concern revolves around the ability of vic-
tims to receive proper compensation.133 If American attorneys had
guided the cases as class actions, the victims' compensation would
most likely not have been equitable. First, there were inherent diffi-
culties in locating Bhopal victims who should have been included in
the class action.' 8 Second, as India is a country fraught with bu-
reaucratic confusion,135 there was a strong possibility that damage
awards garnered by American attorneys on behalf of non-partici-
pating class action plaintiffs would have required an Indian admin-
istrative clearinghouse. The time and money involved in this en-
deavor could conceivably have resulted in untimely and wholly
insufficient recovery by the actual victims. However, if the Indian
government had acted as sole representative for the victims, a sub-
stantial amount of bureaucratic entanglement could have been
eliminated. The government would have automatically served as an
130. Union Carbide Fights for Its Life, supra note 95, at 55.
131. Galanter, supra note 2, at 290 n.83.
132. Union Carbide Fights for Its Life, supra note 95, at 55. In fact, the Indian gov-
ernment rejected a $200 million settlement offer by Union Carbide. Galanter, supra note 2,
at 285.
133. Note that American lawyers' inability to streamline actions prompted consolida-
tion of all claims. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. The United States govern-
ment had an interest in assuring compensation for the victims since it would have made for
good foreign policy in an increasingly hostile world environment.
134. Galanter, supra note 2, at 282. The author states that many poor Indians go
through life without legal identity and status. The country has an inadequate system of
records in drivers' licenses, social security and national health. Id. Because Rule 23(c)(2)
requires notice to each affected member of a class, problems of locating victims would be
compounded. See infra Appendix B.
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administrative award distribution system. Although some bottle-
necks still would have existed, at least one step in the process of
compensating the victims would have been removed. Additionally,
although the problems of identifying victims would have been
largely unmitigated, Indian officials could have acted as informed
local aides to locate potential plaintiffs. From a practical stand-
point, the Indian government would have been the most efficient
party to represent the victims.
A further policy consideration revolves around India's sovereign
immunity.1 36 The Indian government retains immunity against
many causes of action on its home soil.13 7 There were indications
that the Indian government itself may have been at least partially
responsible for the disaster.1 88 If the Indian government was not
permitted access to the United States courts, there may have been
jurisdictional questions concerning the susceptibility of India to
comparative fault principles. 9 However, if the government was al-
lowed to pursue its victims' claims as parens patriae representative,
federal legislation practically assured that India would have been
named as a cross-defendant. 14 This would have aided the courts in
coming to an equitable solution in assessing fault.
A final policy concern is based on American courts' fear of dupli-
cative recovery in parens patriae suits. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. of California,4 1 the Court placed a great deal of emphasis on
duplicative recovery concerns in holding that the plaintiff state had
no standing to sue. The Court stated:
A large . . . part of the injury to the "general economy" . . . is no
more than a reflection of injuries to the "business or property" of
consumers .... Even the most lengthy and expensive trial could
not, in the final analysis, cope with the problems of double recov-
ery inherent in allowing damages for harm both to the economic
interests of individuals and for the quasi-sovereign interests of the
State.1
42
136. Galanter, supra note 2, at 277.
137. CONST. OF INDIA, art. 300.
138. Galanter, supra note 2, at 277, where the author states that lax government regu-
lation and inadequate public services may have contributed to the severity of the accident.
See also Diamond, 1982 Inspector Says Indian Plant Was Below U.S. Safety Standards,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A3, col. 3.
139. Galanter, supra note 2, at 277.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1982) provides for waiver of sovereign immunity with respect
to "any counterclaim . . . arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign state ..
141. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
142. Id. at 264. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1975), a transna-
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In the Union Carbide case, however, duplicative recovery was
unlikely for three reasons. First, the Indian statute provided that
counsel for individuals could work "in association" with the govern-
mental judicial bloc."' 3 While the meaning of this statutory lan-
guage was largely untested, it suggested that individuals could hire
their own counsel to work in conjunction with the government. If
the government and individuals' attorneys worked together on the
recovery, there was a minimal chance of double recovery since all
claims would have been processed under one coordinated body. On
the other hand, as several United States attorneys had filed class
actions which presumably encompassed all victims, each attorney's
recovery would appear to have been duplicative.
Second, the Indian government was not suing for Standard Oil-
styled quasi-sovereign economic damages. As noted above, India
appeared to be asserting its citizens' individual claims primarily in
a "hybrid" parens patriae claim.14 4 Thus, the difficulties of separat-
ing individual and sovereign damages was largely unfounded in the
Union Carbide case, as the Indian government asserted only dam-
ages on behalf of its citizens.
Third, the trial court's concerns in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord seem par-
ticularly significant in the Union Carbide case. In Pfizer, the trial
court found that the "defendants could not be threatened with du-
plicative recovery because the governments' suit would be given res
judicata effect and, in any event, the practical difficulties facing
foreign nationals would generally prevent them from filing their
own suits. 1 45 The appellate court, however, rejected this argu-
ment. 1 46 In the Union Carbide case, unlike Pfizer, the injuries suf-
fered by victims are not as mutable as antitrust violations; the num-
ber of victims is fixed. Because of certain financial and/or physical
deficiencies, practical difficulties became true obstacles to the pre-
sent victims. In addition, those individuals who suffer antitrust inju-
ries are more likely to have the means to sue in their own right
than were the Bhopal victims whose injuries were not proportionate
to their respective wealth.
Policy concerns unique to this case and those of general applica-
bility lent support to the Indian government's parens patriae claim.
tional case, the court expressed the same concerns and in fact cited the above passage in
coming to its determination.
143. Act, supra note 4, § 3(4).
144. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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This assertion is also supported by principles of international
comity.
C. Analogous Transnational Jurisprudence
In addition to policy concerns surrounding the Union Carbide
case, analogous transnational legal principles also lend support to
the proposition that India's statute should have satisfied American
requirements. These principles, which were developed first through
customary international law, were later codified in many instances,
and could now be applied in light of ambiguities in the current
state of United States law.
Under customary international law, civilized nations have long
recognized the existence of an international minimum standard re-
garding judicial treatment of aliens.147 Under this doctrine, courts
of civil law nations have held that foreigners are entitled to the
same treatment as citizens of that country. 14 8 The court in Cantero
Herrera v. Canevaro & Co."1 9 aptly elucidated the standard as fol-
lows: "Equality between natives and foreigners before the Civil
Law implies their equality as to judicial competency and form of
proceeding in the same subject-matter; hence, foreigners enjoy in
Peru the same rights, means, recourses and guarantees as nationals
to sue for and defend their rights . . . ." Most civil law countries
and the United Nations have since subscribed to this view.151 Com-
mon law courts, including those in the United States, have also rec-
147. See generally SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
545-73 (1981).
148. Id.
149. Peru, Supreme Court, 1927 [1927-28] Ann. Dig. 219 (No. 149), reprinted in
SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEACH, supra note 147, at 552-56.
150. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEACH, supra note 147, at 553 (quoting Peru Supreme
Court opinion). The court noted that its holding was not based purely on customary law by
stating that
[t]he condition of foreigners in Peru . . . is not left entirely to the provisions of
international convenience, nor subordinated to the simple fact of reciprocity, since
Articles 32 and 33 of our Civil Code provide that "civil rights are independent of
the status of the citizen," and that "foreigners enjoy in Peru all rights concerning
the security of their persons and property and the free administration of the same."
Id. (quoting Peru Supeme Court opinion). Note that Latin American countries have denied
that there is an international standard over and above equality with nationals. Id. Although
there has been debate as to whether an international or municipal standard should apply, it
appears that the latter has taken precedence. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L. L.,
863, 888 (1961).
151. See, e.g., Chattin (United States) v. United Mexican States, General Claims
Commission, 4 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 282 (1927).
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ognized the validity of this principle of international comity.152
Despite the widespread usage of the customary international
principle, some states have gone one step further by enacting bilat-
eral treaties. Most of these treaties provide broad provisions for
equality of foreigners in municipal courts. For example, a treaty
may specify that:
(1) The nationals of one Contracting Party shall enjoy in the
territory of the other the same rights in respect of the legal pro-
tection of person and property, and shall have free access to the
courts of justice for the prosecution or defence of their rights
under the same conditions, including the taxes and fees payable,
as nationals of the other Contracting Party.
(2) This Article applies to criminal as well as to civil and com-
mercial matters. 153
Some countries have provided for more narrow applications of
the doctrine. For instance, several countries have enacted bilateral
treaties addressing judicial treatment of foreigners involved in in-
dustrial accidents and occupational diseases. One treaty states that
"[Foreigners] shall enjoy the benefits of such legislation as if they
were nationals of the country concerned."' " Thus, the doctrine has
varied uses and flexible applications.
The customary and codified aspects of the doctrine provide sup-
port for the contention that the Indian government should have
been permitted to represent the Bhopal victims as parens patriae.
Although India and the United States have not signed a treaty in
this specific area, the American-Iranian " treaty relied upon by the
plaintiffs in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,1 6 provides insight to the present
situation. In Pfizer, the court found that the treaty guaranteed ac-
cess to the United States courts only on the same terms available to
United States nationals.
15 7
When Pfizer was decided in 1975, no United States court had
yet approved federal legislation permitting statutory parens patriae
152. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1975).
153. Art. 12 of the Convention Regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Israel-United Kingdom of Great Britain-Northern Ireland, July 5, 1966, 630
U.N.T.S. 189.
154. Art. 2 of the Convention between the Italian Republic and the Principality of
Monaco on Insurance against Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, Italy-Mon-
aco, December 6, 1957, 363 U.N.T.S. 45.
155. Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations, August 15, 1955, United States-lran, 8
U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
156. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
157. Id. at 619 n.9.
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representation. However, eight years later, in Commissioner of
Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors,158 the court
held that federal legislation could expand the use of common law
parens patriae actions.15 9 If United States citizens may gain access
to courts through statutory parens patriae plans to avoid practical
difficulties in massive class action claims (as the Mid-Atlantic court
reasoned),1 60 the barrier is thus removed for foreign plaintiffs. A
foreign government could apparently now gain parens patriae rep-
resentation pursuant to federal legislation. In the Union Carbide
case, it appears that a congressional directive granting the Indian
government parens patriae status would have satisfied international
laws of comity. Alternatively, the United States could have sub-
stantially streamlined procedures by recognizing the Indian statute
as a valid attempt to represent its citizens. Even though the United
States and India presently have no reciprocal equal access treaty,
this case could have been valuable in furthering the principles of
international comity.
CONCLUSION
The complex nature of the Bhopal tragedy is one of the greatest
environmental/industrial torts of all history. In particular, the In-
dian government's attempt to act as parens patriae representative
for its injured citizens presented a difficult new issue for United
States courts which previously have not allowed foreign sovereigns
such status. For several reasons, however, India should have been
permitted the status it sought.
This Comment has examined the reasons in favor of granting In-
dia parens patriae representation. First, it traced the development
of American parens patriae law to demonstrate the potential for
new interpretations. 161 Next, it examined the unusual circum-
stances of the Union Carbide case which warranted application of
the parens patriae doctrine. 162 Finally, it analyzed several factors in
support of India's contention: United States case law, policy con-
cerns, and analogous transnational jurisprudence. "
The formation of new legal principles to accommodate the Union
158. 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 129-30.
160. Id. at 128.
161. See supra notes 11-73, and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99-160 and accompanying text.
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Carbide case would have not only benefited the immediate claim-
ants, but would also have aided victims of future transnational
torts. As United States based multinational corporations expand
their operations over the globe and as nations become increasingly
interdependent, other major industrial torts are certain to occur. If
the United States takes the lead in allowing parens patriae repre-
sentation in these situations, the next wave of victims will encounter
more orderly legal proceedings than those faced by the unfortunate
Bhopal claimants.
Lisa F. Butler*
* Thanks to my parents, E.C. and Joan, for listening to "Bhopal" for one year.
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Appendix A: Taken from the Current Indian Statute 1985, Part
III, at 19 (Suri Ed. 1986).* Published originally in Gazette of In-
dia (Ext.), Part II, Section I, No. 19, dated February 20, 1985.
* This is an accurate representation of the ordinance as it appears
in the current Indian Statute, 1985. All typographical errors are in
original.
THE BHOPAL GAS LEAK DISASTER (PROCESSING OF CLAIMS) ORDI-
NANCE 1985
ORDINANCE No. I of 1985
Promulgated by the President in the Thirty-sixth Year of the Re-
public of India
An Ordinance to confer certain powers on the Central Govern-
ment to secure that claims arising out of, or connected with, the
Bopal gas leak disaster are dealt with speadily, effectively, equita-
bly and to the best advantage of the claimants and for matters inci-
dental thereto.
Whereas Parliament is not in session and the President is satis-
fied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to
take immediate action;
Now, Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause
(1) of article 123 of the constitution, the President is pleased to
promulgate the following Ordinance:-
1. Short title and commencement-(1) This Ordinance may be
called the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Processing of Claims) Ordi-
nance, 1985.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Definition.-In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise
requires.-
(a) "Bhopal gas leak disaster" or "disaster" means the occur-
rence on the 2nd and 3rd days of December, 1984 which involved
the release of highly noxious and abnormally dengerous gas from a
plant in Bhopal (being a plant of the Union Carbide India Limited,
a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation. U.S.A.) and which
resulted in loss of life and damage to property on an extensive
scale;
(b) "claim" means-
(i) a claim, arising out of, or connected with the disaster, for
compensation or damages for any loss of life or personal injury
which has been, or is likely to be, suffered;
(ii) a claim, arising out of, or connected with the disaster, for
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any damage to property which has been, or is likely to be,
sustained:
(iii) a claim for expenses incurred os required to be incurred
for containing the disaster or mitigating or otherwise coping with
the effects of the disaster;
(iv) any other claim (including any claim by way of loss of
business or employment) arising out of, or connected with, the
disaster;
(c) "claimant" means a person entitled to make a claim;
(d) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner appointed under
section 6;
(e) "person" includes the Government;
(f) "Scheme" means a Scheme framed under section 9.
Explanation.-For the purposes of clauses (b) and (c), where the
death of a person has taken place as a result of the disaster, the
claim for compensation or damages for the death of such person
shall be for the benefit of the spouse, children (including a child in
the womb) and other heirs of the deceased and they shall be
deemed to be the claimants in respect thereof.
3. Power af Central Government to represent claimants.-(1)
Subject to the other provisions of this Ordinance, the Central Gov-
ernment shall, and shall have the exclusive right to represent, and
act in place of (whether within or outside India) every person who
has made, or is entitled to make, a claim for all purposes connected
with such claim in the same manner and to the same effect as such
person.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1), the purposes referred to therein
include-
(a) institution of any suit or other proceeding in or before any
court or other authority (whether within or outside India) or with-
drawal of any such suit or other proceeding, and
(b) entering into a compromise.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply also in relation
to claims in respect of which suits or other proceeding have been
instituted in or before any court or other authority (whether within
or outside India) before the commencement of this Ordinance:
Provided that in the case of any such suit or other proceeding
with respect to any claims pending immediately before the the com-
mencement of this Ordinance in or before any court or other au-
thority outside India, the Central Government shall represent, and
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act in place of, or along with such claimant, if such court or other
authority so permits.
4. Claimant's right to be represented by a legal prac-
tioner.-Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, in repre-
senting, and acting in place of, any person in relation to any claim,
the Central Government shall have due regard to any matters
which such person may require to be urged with respect to his
claim and shall, if such person so desires, permit at the expense of
such person, a legal practitioner of his choice to be associated in the
conduct of any suit or other proceeding relating to his claim.
5. Power of Central Government.-For purpose of discharging its
functions under this Ordinance the Central Government shall have
the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following mat-
ters, namely:
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any per-
son from any part of India and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of any
document;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from
any court or office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses
or documents;
(f) any other matter which the Central Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.
6. Commissioner and other officers and employees-(1) For the
purpose of assisting it in discharging its functions under this Ordi-
nance. the Central Government may appoint an officer, to be
known as the Commissioner for the welfare of the victims of the
Bhopal gas leak disaster, and such other officers and employees to
assist him as that Government may deem fit.
(2) The Commissioner shall discharge such functions as may be
assigned to him by the Scheme.
(3) The Commissioner and such of the officers subordinate to
him as may be authorised by the Central Government by notifca-
tion in the Official Gazette in this behalf may, for the discharge of
their functions under the Scheme, exercise all or any of the powers
which the Central Government may exercise under Section 5.
(4) All officers and authorities of the Government shall act in
aid of the Commissioner.
7. Power to delegate.-The Central Government, may by notifi-
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cation in the Official Gazette, delegate, subject to such conditions
and limitations as may be specified in the notification, all or any of
its powers under this Ordinance (excepting the power under section
9 to frame a Scheme) to the Government of Madhya Pradesh or an
officer of the Central Government not below the rank of a Joint
Secretary to that Government or an officer of the Government of
Madhya Pradesh not below the rank of a Secretary to that
Government.
8. Limitation.-(l) In computing, under the Limitation Act,
1963 (36 of 1983) or any other law for the time being in force, the
period of limitation for the purpose of instituting a suit or other
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, any period after the
date on which such claim is registered under, and in accordance
with, the provisions of the Scheme shall be excluded.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any proceedings by
way of appeal.
9. Power to frame a Scheme.-(l) The Central Government,
shall, for carrying into effect the purposes of this Ordinance frame
a Scheme as soon as may be after the commencement of this
Ordinance.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1), a Scheme may provide for all or any
of the following matters, namely:
(a) the registration of the claims under the Scheme and all
matters connected with such registration;
(b) the processing of the claims for securing their enforcement
and matters connected therewith;
(c) the maintenance of records and registers in respect of the
claims;
(d) the creation of a fund for meeting expenses in connecrion
with the administration of the Scheme and of the provisions of this
Ordinance;
(e) the amounts which the Central Government may, after due
appropriation made by Parliament by law in that behalf, credit to
the fund referred to in clause (d) and any other amounts which
may be credited to such fund;
(f) the utilisation, by way of disbursal (including apportion-
ment) or otherwise, of any amounts received in satisfaction of the
claim;
(g) the officer (being a judidial officer of a rank not lower than
that of a District Judge) who make such disbursal or apportion-
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ment in the event of a dispute;
(h) the maintenance and audit of accounts with respect to the
amounts referred to in clause (e) and (f);
(i) the functions of the Commissioner and other officer and
employees appointed under section 6.
10. Removal of doubts.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
deciared that-
(a) any sums paid by the Government to a claimant otherwise
then by way of disbursal of the compensation or damages received
as a result of the adjudication or settlement of his claim by a court
or other authority shall be deemed to be without prejudice to the
adjudication or settlement by such court or other authority of his
claim to rcceive compasation or damages in satisfaetion of his claim
and shall not be taken into account by such court or other authority
in determining the amount of compensation or damages to which
he may be entitled in satisfaction of his claim;
(b) in disbursing under the Scheme the amount received by
way of compensation or damages in satisfaction of a claim as a
result of the adjudication or settlement of the claim by a court or
other authority, deduction shall be made from such amount of the
sums, if any, paid to the claimant by the Govenment by the Gov-
ernment before the disbursal of such amount.
11. Overriding effect.-The provisions of this Ordinance and of
any Scheme framed thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other
than this Ordinance or any instrument having effect by virtue of
any enactment other than this Ordinance.
12. Laying-Every notification issued under clause (f) of section
5 and every Scheme framed under section 9 shall be laid, as soon as
may be after it is made or framed, before each House of Pariia-
ment, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which
may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive ses-
sions and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following
the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree
in making any modification in the notification or the Scheme or
both Houses agree that the notification or the Scheme should not
be made or framed, the notification or the Scheme shall thereafter
have effect, only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the
case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment
shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously
done under that notification or Scheme.
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FED. R. Civ. P.
Rule 23, Class Actions.
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An addition may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appro-
priate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually control-
ling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desira-
bility or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
1987)
31
Butler: Parens Patriae Representation in Transnational Crises: The Bhopal
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Main-
tained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class
Actions. (1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the de-
cision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practi-
cable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The no-
tice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) The judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) the judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be mem-
bers of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice
provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not re-
quested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class,
and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evi-
dence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or
all of the members of any step in the action or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to in-
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tervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent per-
sons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with sim-
ilar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court directs.
33
Butler: Parens Patriae Representation in Transnational Crises: The Bhopal
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
